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This paper considers the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court 
ruling that can be interpreted as supporting the use of eminent domain in trans-
ferring the property rights of one private agent--a landowner--to another private 
agent--a developer. Compared to voluntary exchange, when property rights are 
transferred via eminent domain, landowners’ investments in their properties be-
come more inefﬁ  cient and, as a result, any any beneﬁ  t associated with mitigating 
the holdout problem between landowners and the developer is reduced. Social 
welfare can only increase if the holdout problem is signiﬁ  cant; otherwise, social 
welfare will fall when property rights are transferred via eminent domain.
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A recent Supreme Court decision (Kelo v. New London) has e⁄ectively given commu-
nities the green light for private takings, where local and state governments have the
authority to condemn private property for other private use. The ruling is contro-
versial. Some observers believe the use of eminent domain in the Kelo case does not
ful￿l the public use criterion as stated in the ￿fth amendment to the U.S. constitu-
tion: ￿nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation￿
(my emphasis). They also might point out that the recent ruling seems to contradict
an earlier Court ruling (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midki⁄ ): ￿A purely private
taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve
no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void ... The court￿ s cases
have repeatedly stated that ￿ one person￿ s property may not be taken for the bene￿t of
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensa-
tion be paid,￿.￿Other observers, however, believe that Kelo ruling is fully consistent
with both the constitution and previous Court decisions. The Holmes Court ruled
in 1925 what constitutes public use should be determined by state legislatures; so if
legislatures deem that economic development of private property by private agents
provides bene￿ts to the community at large￿ due to, say, higher employment levels
and tax base￿ then such a taking ful￿ls the public use criterion as stated in the con-
stitution. Proponents of the Kelo ruling would point out that the Supreme Court
had no choice but to rule for the City of New London since the taking was motivated
by the public bene￿ts associated with economic development.
From a public policy prospective, attempting to assess whether a taking is ￿ap-
propriate￿ by determining whether or not it ful￿ls the public use criterion in the
constitution seems almost pointless: given the way the Court has interpreted public
use, ￿almost anything goes￿in the sense that if a state government claims that there
is a public bene￿t associated with a taking, then there is a public bene￿t associated
with the taking. A more meaningful and relevant exercise would be assess the social
welfare implications associated with takings along the lines of Kelo, i.e., where the
government takes property from one private agent and gives it to another (assuming,
of course, that the former receives just compensation). In this paper I present a
model where a developer has the opportunity to redevelop private property that is
currently owned by another private party, a landowner. The developer can obtain the
property rights from the landowner directly￿ by purchasing the property rights from
the landowner￿ or indirectly￿ by having the government take the landowner￿ s prop-
erty rights, subject to providing the landowner with just compensation. When the
landowner purchases the property rights directly from the landowner, the price of the
property rights is determined as a outcome to a bargaining problem; when the gov-
ernment takes the property from the landowner, the landowner receives the market
value of the taken property, which is paid for by the developer. Compared to vari-
ous bargaining schemes, the use of eminent domain always distorts the landowner￿ s
1property investment away from what is e¢ cient.
I consider two di⁄erent bargaining schemes when the developer directly purchases
property rights from landowners. In one scheme I assume that the developer has a
￿xed bargaining weight, independent of how many landowners he bargains with. In
this situation, the use of eminent domain to transfer property always lowers social
welfare compared to bargaining. This scheme, however, may su⁄er from a shortcom-
ing. Some commentators have pointed out that when a developer agent attempts
purchase a number of properties for a project, he may be subject to the holdout
problem, i.e., potential sellers will withhold their property in an attempt to obtain
a larger surplus. In fact, it has been suggested that the use of eminent domain can
be interpreted as the government￿ s solution to this holdout problem. A bargaining
scheme that has a developer with a ￿xed bargaining weight e⁄ectively assumes away
the holdout problem. I, therefore, consider an alternative bargaining scheme that has
the bargaining weight of the developer declining with the number of landowners he
bargains with. Such a bargaining scheme can be interpreted as embodying a notion
of the holdout problem. I ￿nd that even when the holdout problem present, the use
of eminent domain to transfer property rights may lower social welfare. The holdout
problem has to be ￿signi￿cant￿if the use of eminent domain is to have any social
value.
The seminal economics paper on eminent domain and takings is Blume, Rubinfeld
and Shapiro (1984). This paper, and the rather sizeable literature that follows it, focus
on the issue of compensation in an environment where the condemned property is
converted into a public good. The takings literature that addresses the condemnation
of private property for other private use is extremely small. Rolnik and Davies (2006)
and Garrett and Rothstein (2007), relying on solid economic reasoning, point out
that when governments interfere with the market place, bad outcomes usually follow.
Both of these discussions, however, are not conducted within the context of an explicit
model.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section considers a simple
redevelopment-takings environment with one developer and one landowner. In section
3, this environment is extended to one of a single developer and many landowners.
The ￿nal section concludes.
2 A Simple Model with One Landowner
There is a single landowner who is endowed with capital K‘ and property rights to
a tract of land. The landowner can invest his capital in two ways. He can invest in
a safe asset that provides a gross rate of return R and he can make an irreversible
investment x ￿ K‘ on his land, which gives a payo⁄ of f (x), where f0 > 0, f00 < 0
and f0 (0) > R.
A developer is endowed with capital Kd. He can redevelop the landowner￿ s land
and invest in the safe asset. If land is redeveloped, the investment x￿ and therefore,
2potential payo⁄ f (x)￿ is destroyed. Let y represent the amount spent on redevelop-
ment by the developer. There are two states of the world for redevelopment: a good
state and a bad state. The probability that the state is good is 1 ￿ ￿. In the good
state, redevelopment spending y ￿ ￿ y generates a payo⁄ of Y and spending y < ￿ y
gives a zero payo⁄. In the bad state, any expenditure y ￿ 0 gives a zero payo⁄.
In order to redevelop land, the developer must acquire the property rights from
the landowner. If he purchases these rights directly from the landowner, then the
purchase price, p, is determined by bargaining and is given by the solution to the
generalized Nash bargaining problem. The developer￿ s generalized Nash bargaining
weight is denoted by ￿, where 0 < ￿ < 1, and the landowner￿ s bargaining weight is
1￿￿. Since 0 < ￿ < 1, both the landowner and the developer have some bargaining
power.
There exists a government that can condemn and expropriate, i.e., take, the
landowner￿ s property. When the government revokes the landowner￿ s property rights,
it sells them to the developer. The law requires the government provide ￿just com-
pensation￿to the landowner in the event that his land is taken. In this article, just
compensation will be de￿ned as f (x)￿ the value of the property to the landowner
in the event that his property is not taken. One can interpret a taking as essentially
by-passing the bargaining process between the developer and landowner. The gov-
ernment must balance its budget. Hence, if land is taken, the government sells the
property rights to the developer for f (x).
The timing of events is as follows. At date 0, the landowner is born; he invests x
in his property and K‘ ￿ x in the safe asset. In between dates 0 and 1, the state of
world￿ good or bad￿ is revealed. At date 1, the developer is born; he decides whether
or not to redevelop the landowner￿ s property. In the event that the redevelopment
takes place either the developer bargains with the landowner or the government takes
the landowner￿ s property rights and sells them to the developer. In either case, the
developer spends either p or f (x) (at date 2) to acquire the property rights, where
he spends p if the he bargains with the landowner and f (x) if he gets the property
rights, via eminent domain, from the government. The developer invests (Kd ￿ y) in
the safe asset if he obtains the property rights to the land; otherwise he invests Kd
in the safe asset. At date 2 all investments pay o⁄, payments are exchanged and the
landowner and developer consume.
The objective of the landowner and the developer is to maximize their expected
payo⁄s. The timing of the births of a landowner and the developer prevents them
from interacting before the landowner makes his investment decision. This timing
assumption is designed to re￿ ect the real world fact that developers enter the scene
long after initial investments are undertaken.
32.1 Social Optimum
At date 0, the landowner invests x in his property. With probability ￿, the state of the
world is bad and it is not e¢ cient to redevelop the land. In this situation the payo⁄
to the landowner is f (x)+(K‘ ￿ x)R and the payo⁄ to the developer is KdR. With
probability (1 ￿ ￿), the state is good and it will be e¢ cient to redevelop the land only
if the total payo⁄to redevelopment, Y +(Kd ￿ ￿ y)R+(K‘ ￿ x)R, exceeds the payo⁄
to not redeveloping the land, f (x)+KdR+(K‘ ￿ x)R; or if Y ￿ ￿ yR ￿ f (x). De￿ne
a critical level of investment in land, xc, as
Y ￿ ￿ yR = f (xc):
If x ￿ xc, then it is e¢ cient to redevelop the land in the good state; if x > xc, then it is
not. To make the redevelopment problem interesting, I will assume the e¢ cient level
of investment in land￿ described below￿ is strictly less than xc. If the e¢ cient level
of investment in land is greater than xc, then redevelopment never socially optimal.
The e¢ cient level of investment in land is determined by the solution to
max
x ￿(f (x) + KdR) + (1 ￿ ￿)(Y + (Kd ￿ ￿ y)R) + (K‘ ￿ x)R; (1)
i.e., the e¢ cient level of investment in land maximizes total expected payo⁄to society.




￿) = R: (2)
The social optimum is characterized by:
1. the landowner investing x￿ at date 0;
2. the developer spending ￿ y on redevelopment in the good state; and
3. no redevelopment in the bad state.
2.2 Redevelopment Under Bargaining
The developer has no incentive to obtain property rights in the bad state. In the
good state, the (date 2) payo⁄ to the developer when he does obtain property rights
is (Y ￿ ￿ yR ￿ p) and (date 2) the payo⁄to the landowner is (p ￿ f (x)). Note that the
developer spends y = ￿ y for redevelopment. At the time of bargaining, the investment
x is sunk for the landowner but the investment ￿ y for the developer is not; this is why
the term ￿￿ yR￿shows up in the developer￿ s payo⁄function and there is no comparable
term in the landowner￿ s payo⁄ function. De￿ne the total surplus associated with
redevelopment in the good state as S (x), where
S (x) = Y ￿ ￿ yR ￿ f (x);
4S0 (x) < 0 for all x > 0 and S (xc) = 0. If S (x) > 0￿ or equivalently x < xc￿ then the
developer will want to redevelop the land; if S (x) ￿ 0￿ or equivalently x ￿ xc￿ then
he will not. If S (x) > 0, then the price that the developer pays for the landowner￿ s
property rights, p, is given by the solution to
max
p (Y ￿ ￿ yR ￿ p)
￿ (p ￿ f (x))
1￿￿ ;
which is
p = ￿f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)(Y ￿ ￿ yR):
Suppose ￿rst that the landowner believes (correctly) that S (x) ￿ 0 for his choice
of x; then the optimal investment in his property is given by the solution to
max
x ￿f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)(Y ￿ ￿ yR)] + (K‘ ￿ x)R: (3)
Note that the landowner￿ s objective function can be rewritten as
f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)S (x) + (K‘ ￿ x)R:
The solution, xB, is characterized by
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)f
0 (xB) = R; (4)
where ￿B￿stands for ￿bargaining.￿Comparing (4) with (2), note that xB > x￿; the
landowner￿ s investment in his property is larger than what is socially optimal.
Suppose now the landowner believes (correctly) that S (x) < 0 for his choice of x;
then his optimal investment investment is given by the solution to
max
x f (x) + (K‘ ￿ x)R: (5)
The solution of (5) is characterized by
f
0 (xN) = R; (6)
where the ￿N￿stands for ￿no bargaining.￿Comparing (4) with (6), note that xN >
xB > x￿. Since S0 (x) < 0 for all x > 0,
S (x
￿) > S (xB) > S (xN):
If S (xN) > 0, i.e., xN < xc, then the developer will always redevelop the
landowner￿ s land in the good state. If S (xN) > 0, then the relevant problem for
landowner is (3) and he invests xB.
If S (xB) < 0, i.e., xB > xc, then developer will never redevelop the landowner￿ s
property and relevant problem is given by (5). Hence, the landowner invests xN and
no redevelopment takes place.
5Finally, if S (xB) > 0 and S (xN) < 0, then landowner￿ s level of investment
will determine whether or not there will be redevelopment in the good state. That
is, if the landowner believes that redevelopment will occur, then he will invest xB
and redevelopment will occur in the good state. If he believes that redevelopment
will not occur, then he will invest xN and in the good state, the developer will
have no incentive to redevelop the landowner￿ s land. How much will the landowner
invest at date 0, xB or xN? While one might be tempted to conjecture that the
landowner will invest xB, since the surplus associated with investment xB is greater
than investment xN, the landowner may actually invest xN. This possible outcome is a
feature associated with generalized Nash bargaining: the generalized Nash bargaining
solution is not monotonic, which implies that although total surplus increases, the
landowner￿ s expected share (and payo⁄) decreases. So although S (xB) > 0 and
S (xN) < 0, it may be the case that
f (xN) + (K‘ ￿ xN)R > f (xB) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)S (xB) + (K‘ ￿ xB)R: (7)
Therefore, if S (xB) > 0 and S (xN) < 0 and condition (7) holds, then the landowner
will invest xN; if condition (7) does not hold, then he will invest xB.
Note that there are ine¢ ciencies associated with redevelopment via bargaining,
compared to the social optimum. First, the landowner always ￿overinvests￿in his
property since xN > xB > x￿. Second there may be too little redevelopment. In the
social optimum, it is always e¢ cient to redevelop in the good state. If S (xB) < 0, then
redevelopment will never occur under bargaining; and if S (xB) > 0, S (xN) < 0and
condition (7 holds, then redevelopment will not occur under bargaining.
2.3 Eminent Domain
Under eminent domain, a government can take the landowner￿ s property but must
provide ￿just compensation,￿f (x), to the landowner. The government then sells the
property rights to the developer for f (x). In terms of the model, eminent domain
can be interpreted as giving all of the bargaining power to the developer since the
landowner does not receive any of the surplus associated with redevelopment.
Proposition 1 Using eminent domain to transfer property rights never increases but
can decrease social welfare compared to bargaining.
Proof. If the level of landlord investment, x, is such that redevelopment will occur
in the good state, i.e., x < xc, then social welfare can be written as
W (x) = f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)S (x) ￿ xR + (Kd + K‘)R;
If landlord investment is such that redevelopment does not occur in the good state,
i.e., x ￿ xc, then social welfare is given by
~ W (x) = f (x) ￿ xR + (Kd + K‘)R:
6Note that if the landowner optimally chooses x = xB under bargaining, then necessar-
ily, redevelopment occurs under bargaining. Under eminent domain, the landowner
will always receive a payo⁄ of f (x) + (K‘ ￿ x)R, independent of the redevelopment
outcome, which means that he will always invests xN. When x = xN, redevelopment
may or may not occur under eminent domain depending on whether xN < xc or
xN ￿ xc, respectively. Hence, if xN < xc, we have
W (x
￿) > W (xB) > W (xN) > W (xc)
since W (x) is strictly concave for all x 2 [0;xc]. If xB < xc < xN, we have
W (x
￿) > W (xB) > ~ W (xN) > W (xc) = ~ W (xc)
There are a number of cases to consider:
1. If S (xB) < 0, then redevelopment does not take place under bargaining and
the landowner invests xN; in this case, eminent domain and bargaining generate
the same level of welfare.
2. If S (xN) > 0, then under bargaining the landowner invests xB and redevelop-
ment occurs in the good state. Under eminent domain, the landowner invests xN
and the developer redevelops in the good state. In this case, the overinvestment
problem is exacerbated under eminent domain, compared to bargaining￿ since
xN > xB > x￿; here social welfare is lower under eminent domain compared to
the bargaining since W (xB) > W (xN).
3. If S (xB) > 0 and S (xN) < 0 and condition (7) does not hold, then under bar-
gaining, the landowner will invest xB and redevelopment will occur in the good
state. In this case, welfare is W (xB). Under eminent domain, the landowner
will invest xN > xc > xB; there will be too much investment and too little rede-
velopment. In this case welfare is ~ W (xN). Since ~ W (xN) < W (xB), the use of
eminent domain strictly lowers welfare. If, however, S (xB) > 0 and S (xN) < 0
and condition (7) holds, then the landowner will invest xN under both eminent
domain and bargaining. Social welfare will be the same under bargaining and
eminent domain.
From all of this we can conclude that the use of eminent domain will never increase
social welfare but may lower it.
2.4 Discussion
Up to this point, the analysis seems to indicate that the recent Supreme Court on
Kelo v. New London is wrong-headed: eminent domain, in conjunction with just
compensation, can never increase social welfare and can only lower it. Eminent
7domain, along with just compensation, e⁄ectively gives all of the bargaining power
to the developer, i.e., eminent domain and just compensation e⁄ectively sets ￿ = 1
in the landowner￿ s investment problem (3), making it equivalent to (5). It is true
that, absent eminent domain, the level of landowner investment x is too high, but
the use of eminent domain, along with just compensation, can only exacerbate the
overinvestment problem. Not only may there be too much investment but the higher
level of landowner investment may result in no redevelopment at all in the good state.
Parties who have their property taken by the government often claim that they are
undercompensated. In the context of the model, if a landowner is compensated f (x)
for his property rights, then there is legitimacy to the claim that he is undercompen-
sated. In the real economy, there does not exist a market with a well-de￿ned price
for, say, real estate. The price for real estate is typically determined by bargaining
between a seller and buyers. The purchase price of land via bargaining, p, is always
strictly greater than the level of just compensation, f (x), as long as both parties to
the bargain have some bargaining power, i.e., ￿f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)[Y ￿ R￿ y] > f (x). So,
in fact, landowner￿ s receive a lower price for their property via eminent domain than
they could have obtained by dealing directly with buyers (developers).
There are two ways that one can restore social e¢ ciency via governmental takings.
One way has the government giving ￿more than just compensation￿to the landowner.
To see this, suppose that government compensates the landowner by transferring the
entire (net) surplus to him. Such a scheme is equivalent to the landowner having all
of the bargaining power. When the landowner has all of the bargaining power, then
the landowner￿ s decision problem is given by (3) with ￿ = 0; the solution to this
problem is x = x￿. A second way to restore e¢ ciency is to give a ￿xed payment c,
perhaps equal to zero, to the landowner. (In light of the results of Blume, Rubinfeld
and Shapiro (1984), this result should not be that surprising.) In this case, the
landowner￿ s investment problem is
max
x ￿f (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)c + (K‘ ￿ x)R;
which has the solution x = x￿.
In practice, one would conjecture the neither one of these schemes would be im-
plemented as a policy. An arbitrary ￿xed payment c would probably not pass a ￿just
compensation￿criterion. Passing a law that requires the entire net surplus associated
with redevelopment be transferred away from developers to the landowners when em-
inent domain is used would probably not gain su¢ cient support in a legislature since,
by using eminent domain, the legislature wants developers to redevelop; giving them
zero surplus might have the opposite e⁄ect.
3 A Model with Many Landowners
In the model presented in section 2, the only interesting decision problem is that of the
landowner; the developer simply decides whether or not to redevelop the landowner￿ s
8property since the amount spent on redevelopment is essentially predetermined. In
this section, we make the developer￿ s problem more interesting and realistic by having
him determine both the amount of land to redevelop and the amount to spend on re-
development. This richer environment can be had by making only slight modi￿cations
to the model in section 2.
Suppose now there are N landowners, each having property rights to their own
tract of land. The total value associated with property redevelopment is given by Y =
F (A;y), where A represents the tracts of land or properties used for redevelopment
and y is the total amount spent on redevelopment. I assume the function F (A;y) is
strictly concave and increasing in both of its arguments, with FA (0;y) = Fy (A;0) !
1 for y;A > 0.1
The timing of events is as follows: At date 0, landowners are born and invest x
in their property and K‘ ￿ x in the safe asset. At date 1, the developer is born; he
decides how many properties he wishes to redevelop, A, and the total amount that
he will spend on redevelopment, y. The developer either bargains with a set of A
landowners or the government takes the landowners￿property rights away from A
landowners and sells them to the developer. In either case the developer spends Ap
or Af (x) (at date 2) to acquire the property rights. The developer invests (Kd ￿ y)
in the safe asset. At date 2, all investments pay o⁄, payments are exchanged and the
landowners and the developer consume.
3.1 Social Optimum
Let W (x;y;A) represent the total payo⁄to society. The e¢ cient values of investment,
x and y, and property redevelopment, A, are given by the solution to
max
x;y;A
W (x;y;A) = max
x;y;A
(N ￿ A)f (x) + F (A;y) + N (K‘ ￿ x)R + (Kd ￿ y)R (8)
All N landowners invest x in their property and the remainder of their capital in
the safe asset. A total of A properties will be redeveloped. Hence, the total payo⁄
to landowner investment will be (N ￿ A)f (x) and the payo⁄ to redevelopment is
F (A;y). The developer spends y on redevelopment, which implies that he invests
(Kd ￿ y) in the safe asset. The e¢ cient levels of investments, x and y, and property





0 (x) = R; (9)
Fy (A;y) = R: (10)
and
FA (A;y) = f (x) (11)
1One can assume, as in Nosal (2001), that only a fraction of properties are suitable for redevel-
opment. Qualitatively speaking, this would not a⁄ect any of the results.
9Conditions (9) and (10) simply say that the expected return to investments x
and y, respectively, equals the opportunity cost of capital, R. In terms of property
redevelopment, condition (11), the developer continues to redevelop properties until
the value last unit redeveloped equals the (social) cost of redevelopment, which is the
value of the landowner￿ s destroyed investment, f (x). I compactly denote the e¢ cient
levels of investment and property redevelopment by (x￿;y￿;A￿):
Let A(x) denote the e¢ cient amount of land redevelopment given that (i) landown-
ers invest x and (ii) spending on redevelopment, y, is e¢ cient, i.e., given by equation
(10). For what follows, it will be useful to diagrammatically characterize the social
optimum in (x;A) space. The slope of the locus of points described by (9) is negative






(N ￿ A) < 0: (12)
Equation (9) is depicted in ￿gure 1 as ‘^ x; ￿‘￿for landowner. Note that the allocation
(^ x;0) lies on locus ‘^ x, where ^ x solves f0 (^ x) = R. As well, since A ! N as x ! 0,
allocation (0;N) lies on locus ‘^ x. The slope of the locus of points described by











since, from (10), dy = ￿FAy=FyydA and F is strictly concave. Figure 1 depicts














10In ￿gure 1, ‘^ x and dd0 loci intersect twice; social welfare is maximized at point a￿,
where the slope of ‘^ x curve is steeper than that of the dd0 curve.2 Moving away from
the point of intersection a￿ = (x￿;A￿) along either curve ‘^ x or dd0 unambiguously
lowers social welfare. Assuming that condition (10) holds, the slope of a social welfare




(N ￿ A)f0 (x) ￿ NR
f (x) ￿ FA (A;y)
:
For allocations on the ‘^ x curve, the slope of the social welfare indi⁄erence curve
is zero and for allocations on the dd0 curve, it is in￿nite. A typical social welfare
indi⁄erence curve that intersections allocation ~ a (where ~ A > A￿ and ~ x < x￿) is given
by the ellipse denoted S ~ W in ￿gure 1. Note that for allocations that are south-east of
allocation a￿ = (x￿;A￿) and that lie in between (but not on) the ‘^ x and dd0 curves￿
such as allocation ~ a￿ the slopes of the social welfare indi⁄erence curves are all strictly
positive and ￿nite. This implies that if two allocations lie in the cone given by ^ xa￿d0
and a line that connects the two allocations has a strictly negative slope, such as
allocations ￿ a and ~ a in ￿gure 1, then the allocation that has higher redevelopment, A,
and lower investment, x, will generate a higher level of social welfare, i.e., the social
welfare associated with allocation ￿ a exceeds that of ~ a in ￿gure 1.
3.2 Redevelopment Under Bargaining
Unless the developer plans on only redeveloping one tract of land, he must bargain
with more than one landowner. Since bargaining theory does not o⁄er a de￿nitive
approach when bargains involve more than 2 parties, I will consider two bargaining
schemes. In one scheme, it is assumed that the developer has a ￿xed bargaining
power￿ i.e., a ￿xed bargaining weight in the generalized Nash bargaining problem￿
￿, independent of how many landowners he bargains with. Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that ￿ = 1=2. In the other scheme, it is assumed that the developer￿ s
bargaining power ￿ (A) falls as the number of landowners he bargains with, A, in-
creases, i.e., ￿
0 (A) < 0. For simplicity, I will assume that ￿ (A) = 1=(A + 1).
3.2.1 Fixed Bargaining Power
It is assumed that the developer￿ s bargaining weight is ￿ = 1=2 and, if there are A
landowners involved in the bargain, each landowner￿ s bargaining weight is (1 ￿ ￿)=A =
1=(2A). The net surplus received by the developer if each landowner receives p for
transferring his property rights to the developer is F (A;y)￿yR￿pA; the net surplus
received by each of the A landowners is p ￿ f (x). The compensation p that each
2The appendix constructs an example where the ‘^ x and dd0 curves intersect twice￿ as in ￿gure
1￿ and demonstrates that a￿ is the solution to problem (8).
11landowner receives for transferring their property rights to the developer is given by
the solution to the multiperson generalized Nash bargaining problem,
max
p (F (A;y) ￿ yR ￿ pA)
1
2 (p ￿ f (x))
1




p (F (A;y) ￿ yR ￿ pA)
1










(F (A;y) ￿ yR)
A
: (14)














F (A;y) ￿ yR
A
￿
+ (K‘ ￿ x)R: (15)









0 (xB) = R: (16)
The developer￿ s choice of property redevelopment, A, and spending on redevelop-
ment, y, is given by the solution to
max
A;y
F (A;y) ￿ pA + (Kd ￿ y)R:





(F (A;y) ￿ Af (x) ￿ yR) + KdR:
The solution to the developer￿ s problem is given by
Fy (A;y) = R (17)
and
FA (A;y) = f (x): (18)
Note a few things. First, the developer￿ s choice of y and A does not depend directly
on his bargaining strength; the choices do depend indirectly on bargaining strength
since the landowner￿ s choice of x depends upon on the bargaining strengths and
the developer￿ s choice variables depend on x. Second￿ and this is related to the
￿rst observation￿ given the amount of investment undertaken by landowners, x, the
amount of property redeveloped, A, and the amount spent on redevelopment, y, are
e¢ cient, i.e., compare (17) and (18) with (10) and (11), respectively. The developer
will choose y and A so as to maximize total surplus since this also maximizes his share
of the surplus. Diagrammatically speaking, the developer￿ s decision is described by


















The the locus of points that describe the landowner￿ s optimal investment decision,
















> N ￿ A:
From ￿gure 2, the equilibrium outcome aB = (xB;AB) is given by the lower intersec-
tion of the ‘1^ x and dd0 curves. It is evident that when the developer and landowners
bargain over the price of landowners￿property rights, there will be, from a social
perspective, too much investment in property, xB > x￿, and, as a result, too little
redevelopment activity, AB < A￿. (The total amount of investment associated with
redevelopment, y, can be higher than, lower than or equal to y￿, depending on the
sign of FAy.)
The equilibrium outcome aB = (xB;AB) di⁄ers from the socially e¢ cient levels
because landowners take account of the fact that if their property is purchased for
redevelopment, then, through the bargaining process, the purchase price will depend
positively on the amount of investment undertaken. Because of this, landowners will
tend to overinvestment in their properties.
133.2.2 Variable Bargaining Power
Here I assume that the developer￿ s bargaining power declines with the number of
landowners he bargains with, i.e., ￿
0 (A) < 0. I will further assume that each party to
the bargain has the same bargaining power which implies that ￿ (A) = (A + 1)
￿1. As
in the previous section, the net surplus that the developer receives is Y (A;y)￿pA￿Ry
and p￿f (x) is the surplus that each landowner who sells his property rights receives.
The compensation p that each landowner receives for transferring their property rights
to the developer is given by the solution to
max
p (F (A;y) ￿ pA ￿ Ry)
1





f (x) + F (A;y) ￿ yR
A + 1
:








f (x) + F (A;y) ￿ yR
A + 1
+ (K‘ ￿ x)R:











0 (x) = R (20)



























The developer￿ s choice of property redevelopment, A, and spending on redevelop-






(f (x) + F (A;y) ￿ yR) + (Kd ￿ y)R:
The solution to the developer￿ s problem is given by
FA (A;y) = f (x) +




Fy (A;y) = R (22)
The level of redevelopment spending, y, is e¢ cient for a given level of property re-
development, A, i.e., equation (22). However, the amount of property that will be
redeveloped, A, is no longer e¢ cient for a given x. This should not be surprising.
Intuitively, the developer now faces a trade o⁄ when increasing the number of prop-
erties he develops from socially ine¢ cient levels: although total surplus increases, his
share of the surplus decreases. The end result is that for a given x, the developer will
￿under-redevelop.￿By under-redevelop, I mean that the level of property redevelop-
ment, A, is less than what is e¢ cient given x, A(x), where A(x) solves equations (10)
and (11). To see that there is under-redevelopment, note that equation (21) implies
that, if there is under redevelopment, then
FA (A(x);y) < f (x) +
F (A(x);y) ￿ A(x)f (x) ￿ yR
A(x) + 1
: (23)
15Consider now the e⁄ect of a change in A on the left-hand side of (21), given that
equation (22) holds, i.e.,
dFA
dA








hence, a decrease in A will increase FA. Now consider the e⁄ect of a change A on the












F (A;y) ￿ Af (x) ￿ yR
(A + 1)
2 > 0;
hence, a decrease in A will decrease the right-hand side of (22). Reducing property
redevelopment from what is e¢ cient will increase the left-hand side and will reduce
the right-hand side of (23). Therefore, equation (21) is characterized by a level of
property redevelopment that is less than what is e¢ cient.
The developer￿ s behavior, as given by equations (21) and (22), is described in ￿g-
ure 3 by locus d1d0
1, (the planner￿ s decision along these dimensions is represented by
locus dd0.) The equilibrium aB = (xB;AB) is characterized by the lower intersection
of the d1d0
1 and ‘1^ x loci. As in the case of ￿xed developer￿ s bargaining strength, com-
pared to the social optimum a￿ = (x￿;A￿) landowners overinvest and the developer
redevelops less than A￿ properties. However, whereas, for a given x, the developer￿ s
level of redevelopment is e¢ cient when he has ￿xed bargaining strength, i.e., his re-
development decision lies on locus dd, when he has variable bargaining strength, he
under redevelops.
Intuitively, the ￿distance￿between the dd0 and d1d0
1 loci can be interpetted as a
measure of the holdout problem between the developer and the landowners. If the
holdout problem is not very signi￿cant, then the distance between these two loci will




We assume, as above, that if the landowners￿property rights are transferred to the
developer under eminent domain, then each landowner will receive f (x) as ￿just
compensation.￿
Since, under eminent domain, landowners understand that their payo⁄ will be
f (x) independent of whether or not their property is taken, the optimal behavior for
the landowner is given by f0 (x) = R or x = ^ x. The locus of points that describe
the landowner￿ s optimal investment decision under eminent domain is given by ‘2^ x
in both ￿gures 2 and 4, for, respectively, ￿xed and variable bargaining strengths.
The developer￿ s decision problem is to choose the level of property development, A,




F (A;y) ￿ f (x)A + (Kd ￿ y):
The solution to this problem is
Fy (A;y) = R
and
FA (A;y) = f (x);
which is identical to (17) and (18), respectively (i.e., it is the same as the solution to
the developer￿ s problem when he has ￿xed bargaining strength and property rights are
transferred via bargaining). Diagramatically speaking, solution to the the developer￿ s
decision when property is transferred via eminent domain is represented by by locus
dd0 in ￿gures 1, 2 and 4.
The following two propositions demonstrate that eminent domain may have some
rather undesirable consequences.
Proposition 2 When the developer has ￿xed bargaining strength, if landowners be-
lieve that redevelopment will occur under eminent domain, then social welfare is
strictly lower under eminent domain than under bargaining.
Proof. The equilibrium under bargaining, aB = (xB;AB), is given by the intersection
of the ‘1^ x and dd0 loci in ￿gure 2. The equilibrium under eminent domain, aED =
(^ x;AED), is given by the intersection of the ‘2^ x and dd0 loci. Since social welfare
unambiguously falls as one moves away from a￿ = (x￿;A￿) along the dd0 locus, the
social welfare associated with allocation aB is strictly higher than that of allocation
aED.
Proposition 3 When the developer has variable bargaining strength, if landowners
believe that redevelopment will occur under eminent domain, then social welfare is
strictly lower under eminent domain than under bargaining unless the holdout prob-
lem is ￿signi￿cant￿ ; when the holdout problem is signi￿cant, welfare under eminent
domain exceeds that of bargaining.
Proof. The equilibrium under bargaining when there is no holdout problem is
given by allocation aB = (xB;AB) in ￿gure 4, while the equilibrium under emi-
nent domain￿ for either ￿xed or variable bargaining￿ is given by allocation aED =
(^ x;AED). The level of social welfare associated with the use of eminent domain is
represented by the indi⁄erence curve labeled SWED. When the developer has variable
bargaining strength, the equilibrium under bargaining can lie anywhere on the locus





















the ‘1^ x locus in-between allocations aB and a1
B, i.e., at a2
B in ￿gure 4. Then the level
of social welfare associated with allocation a2
B exceeds that of the eminent domain
allocation, aED. If, however, the holdout problem is signi￿cant, resulting in a d1d0
1
locus￿ which is suppressed in ￿gure 4￿ intersecting locus ‘1^ x at a3
B, then the social
welfare associated with the eminent domain allocation, aED, will exceed that of the
bargaining allocation, a3
B; see ￿gure 4.
3.4 Discussion
When the bargaining power of the developer is ￿xed, the results regarding the use of
eminent domain mirror that of the one landlord case. That is, compared to bargain-
ing, the use of eminent domain exacerbates the landowners￿overinvestment problem
and social welfare is lowered. As well, the level redevelopment is also reduced. When
the bargaining power of the developer is variable, it is still the case that the use of
eminent domain exacerbates the overinvestment problem. If the holdout problem is
not too severe, then￿ as with the case of a ￿xed bargaining power￿ social welfare will
decrease if eminent domain is used to reallocate property rights from landlowners to
the developer. If, however, the holdout problem is severe, then the use of eminent
domain can actually increase social welfare, compared to bargaining.
If policy makers could reliably and costlessly observe the magnitude of the holdout
problem, then the selective use of eminent domain to transfer property rights for
redevelopment could be a social enhancing policy. That is, eminent domain would
18be used only when the holdout problem is severe; otherwise, the developer would
bargain directly with landowners. Of course, the problem here is that one cannot
costlessly observe the magnitude of the holdout problem. And one cannot rely on
developers or landowers to inform policy makers of the extent of the holdout problem.
Developers have an incentive to claim that the holdout problem is severe, since the
use of eminent domain implies that property can be purchased cheaper than through
direct bargaining. Landowners￿would have an incentive to claim that there is no
holdout problem and that they would settle for the same proposed price with anyone
who wanted to purchase their property via bargaining.
In defending the state￿ s right to take property from one private agent and give
it￿ in exchange for just compensation￿ to another private agent, proponents of the
Kelo decision￿ who are often local governments￿ point to the increased bene￿ts asso-
ciated with higher levels of redevelopment, such as employment and taxes. Although
it is true that the use of eminent domain will increase the level of redevelopment￿
and other activities associated with it￿ it is not obvious that this translates into
higher social welfare. For example, allocation aED in ￿gure 4 has a higher level
of redevelopment compared to allocation a2
B, but a lower level of social welfare. If
local goverments equate higher levels employment and tax revenue, that usually ac-
company higher levels of redevelopment, with a higher level of social welfare, then
allowing communities to use eminent domain to promote redevelopment will lead to
bad outcomes in many circumstances. In particular, local governments will use their
power of eminent domain even when the holdout problem is not severe.
4 Conclusion
One might think that a government policy that allows developers to purchase as many
properties that they want for ￿just￿compensation would promote redevelopment and
enhance social welfare. If there is no holdout problem, then such a policy would,
in fact, reduce both redevelopment and welfare. When a holdout problem exists,
such a policy may, indeed, promote redevelopment but it is not at all obvious that
social welfare would be enhanced. Although the use of eminent domain mitigates
the holdout problem, it also exacerbates landowner￿ s overinvestment problem. If the
latter e⁄ect dominates the former￿ and this would occur if the holdout problem is
not too severe￿ then social welfare will be reduced if local governments resort to their
power of eminent domain.
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6 Appendix
The necessary conditions for a maximum to problem (8) are given by (9), (10) and
(11). These conditions will identify a (local) maximum if the following second-order
conditions are satis￿ed,
Fyy < 0 (24)
FyyFAA ￿ F
2










2 < 0 (26)
Conditions (24) and (25) are satis￿ed since F (A;y) is strictly concave. Condition










This condition has a nice interpretation; the ￿rst order conditions identify a (local)
maximum if the ‘^ x curve is steeper than that of the dd0 curve, i.e., compare (12) and
(13).
To show that an equilibrium exists and is characterized by what is identi￿ed in
the text, consider the following example. Let f (x) = x:5and Y (A;y) = A:4y:4. For




￿0:5 = R (27)
:4A
:4y










this function is represented as ‘^ x in ￿gure 1. The decision of the developer is given








20Note that A ! 1 as x ! 0 and x ! 1 as A ! 0. This function is represented as dd0
in ￿gure 1. Together, the ￿rst-order conditions (27), (28) and (29) can be rewritten
as the quadratic equation
￿A
2 + AN ￿ KN = 0;




3. The solution to this quadratic is
A = N ￿
p
N (N ￿ 4K)
2
:
If N > 4K, there will be two solutions, as depicted in ￿gure 1. If N > 4K, then the
maximum is given by allocation given by point a￿, since at point x the slope of the
‘^ x curve is steeper that that of the dd0 curve, (at point b the slope of the dd0 curve is
steeper that that of the ‘^ x curve.) If N ￿ 4K, then the solution is A = N. In the
text, the more interesting case of N > 4K is assumed.
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